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Not too long ago trade books written by well-respected people in the sciences began
dotting the shelves of popular bookstores. Many of them are philosophic treatises on a range of
topics: sweeping overviews of the universe (Steven Hawking's A BriefHistory of Time and
Roger Penrose's The Road to Reality); adjudications of scientific controversies (John Casti's
Paradigms Lost: Images ofMan in the Mirror of Science); and broad accounts of the flow of
human thought with general predictions of the ultimate fate ofthe universe (Machio Kaku's
Hyperspace, or Visions).
Many ofthese works display distinctively non-Christian perspectives. Using Kaku to
illustrate, he postulates (Hyperspace, page 312) the possibility of an evolved analog computer
super-robot that, at the big crunch, may somehow escape to a "hyperspace" outside of our
universe, and from there begin the universe again with the declaration, "Let there be light." In
the concluding pages of Visions (page 352), he states, "According to this startling new picture [of
infinitely many parallel universes], in the beginning there was Nothing. No space. No time. No
matter or energy. But there was the quantum principle, which states that there must be
uncertainty, so even Nothing became unstable, and time particles of Something began to form."
Happily, books like the above, but with Christian perspectives, are also now appearing.
In 2001 ACMS member John Byl completed God and the Cosmos (Banner of Truth Trust),
which offers a Christian view of cosmology. Now, Byl has produced another work. The Divine
Challenge: on Matter, Mind, Math and Meaning (2004, Banner of Truth Trust) displays an
impressive grasp of philosophical and theological ideas woven together in a 298 page treatise.
The proper audience for this book should be impressed not only by the breadth oftopics covered,
but also by the reasoned nature ofByl's arguments.
What is the divine challenge? Actually, it is a "double challenge, from God to man and
from man to God, to establish who will rule" (page xiii). According to Byl, modem man, in his
arrogance, has presumed that he can be the measure of all things, and, armed with a naturalistic
worldview, give an adequate account of reality. Byl examines the plausibility of this thinking
with special attention to four big-ticket items: matter; mind; mathematics; and meaning.
The book has 15 chapters arranged into several main parts. The preliminary chapters
frame the challenge and present criteria by which worldviews may be judged viable. Several
following chapters analyze how well a naturalistic worldview explains various phenomena.
Then, Byl presents a Christian worldview, which, unfortunately, he dubs The Christian
Worldview (italics mine). Next, several chapters deal with theological issues such as God's
relation to the physical world, freedom and determinism, body and soul, and a Christian view of
mathematics. Finally, there is a nice summary. Each chapter begins with two quotations, one
representing an atheistic view, and an opposing one taken from scripture. The reader is then
treated to a series of probing questions indicating what the chapter is about, followed by a
penetrating analysis and eventual summary of the ideas presented.
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The Divine Challenge: Chapter Titles
1. The Challenge Framed
2. Worldview Wars
3. Naturalism
4. Mysteries of Matter
5. Chance, Cause and Chaos
6. From Matter to Mind
7. From Mind to Math
8. Mysteries ofMathematics
9. Beyond Naturalism
10. The Christian W orldview
11. God and the Physical World
12. Free Will and Responsibility
13. Body and Soul
14. A Christian View of Mathematics
15. The Challenge Settled
Byl frequently refers to mathematics, arguing in chapter 3, for example, that naturalism
has great difficulty in explaining the existence of mathematical objects, which Byl indicates in
chapter 8-Mysteries ofMathematics-have a real but non-material existence located in God's
thoughts. He also argues in that same chapter that naturalism cannot adequately account for
mathematical intuition, or why mathematics applies so widely to the physical world. Other
"mysteries" at least point to mathematical realism for Byl, such as the sense of discovery one
encounters in exploring constructs like the Mandelbrot set.
There are two other chapters whose titles specifically deal with mathematics, of which
one, chapter 7, From Mind to Math, argues more for the failure of naturalism to provide a
satisfactory account of why we can have confidence in our reasoning ability. Byl' s thesis is
similar to that given by C.S. Lewis in Miracles, who argues that genuine notions of truth cannot
coherently exist in a being that arose from strictly naturalistic ''blind-chance" causes. (This
argument was recently expanded by Victor Reppert in his book CS Lewis's Dangerous Idea.)
Chapter 14, A Christian View ofMathematics, seeks to explore the relation of God to
mathematics. Byl again opts for mathematical realism, but also attempts to ground a portion of
mathematics-including the law of non-contradiction, the axiom of choice, and notions of a
completed infinity-on attributes of God found in the scriptures.
Byl writes with flair, often using metaphorical images that make the pages skip along.
Consider, for example, the following synopsis he gives of modernity (page 290).
Modernity is collapsing. In the modem world, human reason elevated itself above
God and claimed sovereignty. This entailed that it could criticize all beliefs. Yet, once
reason was given license to criticize all things, it was inevitable that it must eventually
criticize also itself. Then reason unmasks itself as unreasonable. Critical human reason,
once uncorked, is an insatiable acid that dissolves all absolutes, whether in religion,
ethics, science or logic. Eventually it erodes even its own foundation, causing modernity
to self-destruct.
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As well thought out as the book is, there are some items that Byl might consider by way
of improvement if the opportunity for a new edition presents itself. The first relates to the
reading audience. The writing style is quite assertive, and while all ofByl's criticisms of a
naturalistic worldview are good ones, many could be quickly met with ready-made answers from
people holding such perspectives. Thus, I worry that my agnostic friends would dismiss the
book too readily. Likewise, I worry that newer Christians, who may bank portions of their faith
on some of the arguments, eventually will find plausible alternatives to them, and thus be thrown
into a quandary. Such concerns would be assuaged ifByl were to make two simple changes.
First, he could allow opposing views more grace by adding some preliminary remarks
similar to those made by Reppert in his defense of C.S. Lewis: "It seems to me that many
discussions of Lewis's arguments treat these arguments as finished products, to be accepted or
rejected as they stand ... There are, of course, valid points to be made on the side opposing
Lewis ... [who] can either be offered as a final answer or as a spur to think the relevant issues
through oneself' (Reppert, pages 12- 14). Second, Byl might consider toning down the
certainty with which he dismisses a variety of positions. Several times throughout the book he
makes concluding statements like, "Such questions xxx is unable to answer," where xxx is the
name of a person espousing a view with which he disagrees.
There are also instances ofwhat I would call inappropriate criticisms of silence. For
example, Byl classifies William Hasker as a "semi-materialist" and takes Hasker's view of the
soul to task. I would rather dub Hasker as an emergent dualist, but in any case Byl objects to
Hasker's beliefthat souls emerge in conjunction with bodies and that God somehow sustains
souls after death. Says Byl, "Hasker gives no detailed argumentation as to how the soul-field can
transcend physical properties. Nor does he give any rationale for the soul-field becoming selfsustaining at, or before, the death of the brain" (page 245). But Byl himself gives no such
"detailed argumentation" of his version of dualism, stating simply that the "separation [of body
and soul] occurs at death [but that] ... the soul is ultimately to be reunited with a renewed body"
(page 243). To be sure, Byl draws his conclusions from scriptural propositions, but Hasker can
make the same appeal. In other words, ifByl wants to assert the existence a distinct soul, and
rely on scripture to conclude that the soul can interact with the body while the person is alive yet
continue to exist when the person dies, so can Hasker, and Hasker's level of explanation would
be the same as Byl's, even though Hasker has the soul emerging as the body develops.
Sometimes Byl supports a position with arguments that I would judge to be specious. To
illustrate, he argues for a strong form of election, claiming that even faith itself is a gift of grace,
citing Ephesians 2:8 as supporting evidence: "For by grace you have been saved through faith;
and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God." But if one wants to argue for Byl' s conclusion
of faith as a gift, this passage cannot be used to sustain it, because the Greek word translated as
that (touto) is in the neuter gender, and thus does not refer to the feminine noun faith (pistis). So
what does the word that refer to? Actually, that literally reads as this, and it probably refers to
the verb have been saved.
Byl is extremely well-read, and has an impressive bibliography. Nevertheless, there are
at least two sources he omits with which he could have profitably interacted. Conversations on
Mind, Matter, and Mathematics (Princeton, 1989), pits biologist Jean-Pierre Changeux, who
argues that mathematics is merely a product of neural interactions in the human brain, against
mathematician Alain Connes, who argues for an objective, independent existence of
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mathematical objects. Additionally, Byl chose not to include any references from Mathematics
in a Postmodem Age: A Christian Perspective, (Eerdmans, 2001).
Finally, there are some minor inaccuracies in the book. Kant is said to be an empiricist
(page 38), a label that would puzzle philosophers, as no empiricist would accept Kant's notion of
the synthetic-apriori. A better classification is a constructivist, or maybe a rationalist-empiricist
hybrid. Euclid's theorem on the infinitude of prime numbers is said to be an indirect proof that
"starts offby assuming the number of primes is not infinite" (page 145). Actually, Euclid's
theorem is a direct proof of the claim, "Prime numbers are more than any assigned multitude of
prime numbers." Perhaps less significant, Godel's theorem could be nuanced a bit more
precisely, and Goldbach's conjecture is cast as "any even whole number can be written as a sum
of two primes" (page 145). Byl evidently chose not to bother his readers with a subtler version
ofGodel's theorem, or with the requirement that Goldbach's conjecture requires that the even
number be greater than 2. A danger with this approach, however, is that some knowledgeable
folks, who are reading skeptically and looking for things to pick at, may, because of these
glosses, tend to read the rest of the book more dismissively than they would otherwise.
All things considered, John Byl has produced a notable work. He should be commended
for the time and care he put into it. I am glad I read it, for it contained many thought-provoking
ideas. I would recommend it to a variety of people, but in giving them my recommendation I
would want to mention some cautionary notes already discussed. Meanwhile, I will look
forward to further scholarly writings from the author in the years ahead.
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